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  Ballast water from commercial ships engaged in international trade has been implicated as the 
primary invasion pathway in over 60 percent of new introductions of invasive alien species 
(IAS) in the Great Lakes since 1960. Recent policies have recognized that IAS are a form of 
biological pollution and have become focused on preventing new introductions. Given that 
emissions-based incentives are infeasible for the case of biological emissions, we investigate 
the cost-effectiveness of various performance proxy-based and technology-based economic 
incentives to reduce the threat of new invasions of Ponto-Caspian species in the Great Lakes. 
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The economic and environmental impacts of in-
vasive alien species (IAS)—species that establish 
and spread in ecosystems to which they are not 
native—can be significant (Perrings, Williamson, 
and Dalmazzone 2000). Invasive alien species are 
argued to be the second-most important cause of 
biodiversity loss worldwide (Holmes 1998, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 2001) by, for 
example, out-competing or preying upon native 
species. In addition, IAS can cause or spread dis-
eases to cultivated plants, livestock, and human 
populations, and they often encroach on, damage, 
or degrade assets (e.g., power plants, boats, piers, 
and reservoirs). In the Great Lakes, at least 145 
IAS have been introduced since the 1830s. Many 
early invasions such as sea lamprey and alewife 
were associated with the opening of shipping 
canals that, although they facilitated trade, re-
moved natural barriers. About one-third of the 
documented invasives in the Great Lakes have 
been introduced during the past thirty years, in 
part as a result of increased trade-related shipping 
following the opening of the St. Lawrence Sea-
way (Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality [MDEQ] 1996, Great Lakes Commission 
2000). Although only about 10 percent of intro-
duced species are suspected of having caused any 
damage (Mills et al. 1993), the impacts that have 
occurred are extensive (U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency 2001, MDEQ 1996, Coscarelli 
and Bankard 1999, Reeves 1999). The zebra 
mussel alone is predicted to cost society $5 bil-
lion over the next decade (MDEQ 1996). 
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  Until recently, most IAS management efforts 
focused on post-invasion control or eradication 
(Lupi, Hoehn, and Christie 2003). But there is 
now an increasing emphasis on prevention (Na-
tional Research Council Committee on Ships’ 
Ballast Operations [NRC] 1996). This shift in 
focus has possibly occurred because most new 
IAS introductions are now recognized as a form 
of “biological pollution,” with the risk of new 
invasions being an endogenous function of hu-
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 34/1 (April 2005) 75–89 
Copyright 2005 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 76   April 2005  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
man activities such as trade and travel. For exam-
ple, commercial shipping in the Great Lakes has 
been implicated in over 60 percent of new intro-
ductions since 1960 (Mills et al. 1993), with the 
primary pathway being ballast water.
1 Ballast 
water is often carried in the hulls of ships to 
maintain stability and hull integrity. Ballast water 
levels are altered in ports to adjust for changes in 
cargo, or in transit to improve stability or to 
change hull depth. During ballast water exchange, 
species may be inadvertently transferred into or 
out of a ship. To understand the risk in the Great 
Lakes, consider that each year, approximately 
200–300 ocean-going vessels enter the Great 
Lakes, and these vessels account for 400–600 
round trips in and out of the region. Over 70 per-
cent of these vessels are engaged in the “triangle 
trade” route, which moves grain, coal, and ore 
from the Great Lakes to the Mediterranean, and 
then on to Northern Europe (Reeves 1999). Major 
overseas markets are Western Europe, the Baltics, 
the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This 
“triangle trade” route involving the Ponto-
Caspian region has supplied approximately 70 
percent of Great Lakes invaders between 1985 
and 2000 (Reid and Orlova 2002). Thus, in the 
Great Lakes there is increased emphasis on the 
prevention of trade-related biological invasions 
associated with ballast water. 
  Mandating oceanic ballast water exchange has 
been the predominant preventive approach to IAS 
in the Great Lakes, beginning in 1993 with the 
implementation of the U.S. Nonindigenous Aquatic 
Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, 
and later by the U.S. National Invasive Species 
Act of 1996 and the Canadian Shipping Act of 
1998 (Reeves 1999).
2 However, the success of 
oceanic exchange programs is imperfect because 
new introductions have occurred since 1993 and 
because there are known limitations to the prac-
tice of ballast water exchange.
3 
 The limitations of current regulatory ap-
proaches are now generally recognized, as is the 
need for new policy options that promote both 
safety and cost-effectiveness (NRC 1996, Rigby 
and Taylor 2001). Economists traditionally pre-
scribe emissions-based incentives to encourage 
reductions in emissions, or emissions-based regu-
latory standards to mandate the reductions, at 
least when dealing with conventional pollutants. 
But such emissions-based approaches are not 
applicable in the IAS case. Two features of ves-
sels’ biological emissions complicate matters 
(Horan et al. 2002). First, not every vessel will 
actually emit a species, yet ex ante each vessel is 
a potential emitter, and so society is expected to 
benefit from all vessels undertaking biosecurity 
actions to reduce the probability of an invasion. 
Second, biological emissions are highly stochastic 
and essentially unobservable given current moni-
toring technologies—much like nonpoint source 
pollution (Shortle and Dunn 1986). Conse-
quently, there is no obvious method for directly 
observing or otherwise indirectly measuring 
whether a vessel caused an introduction. 
  Because IAS emissions cannot be measured 
cost-effectively, policies must be based on some 
alternative compliance measure. Options include 
________________________________________________________
__________________________________________ 
1 Solid ballast and hull-fouling were once important causes of intro-
ductions. But solid ballast is now seldom used, and steel hulls com-
bined with anti-fouling techniques have greatly diminished introduc-
tions due to hull-fouling. 
2 All vessels entering the Great Lakes with ballast on board (BOB) 
are required to exchange ballast at sea beyond the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) in a depth of at least 2,000 m, so that ballast salinity levels 
are raised to 30 parts per trillion (ppt) (ocean salinity levels range 
between 34 to 36 ppt). This ballast must then be retained for the dura-
tion of the voyage into the Great Lakes (NRC 1996). Ballast retention 
is the primary prevention measure, while oceanic exchange is secon-
dary. For instance, if some ballast exchange were to take place in the 
Great Lakes—for example, in order to pass through a lock or for safety 
reasons—it is thought that organisms that might survive in the fresh or 
brackish waters of the Great Lakes could not survive in the high saline 
levels that would result from the oceanic exchange, and vice versa 
(Rigby and Taylor 2001). The primary purpose of increasing salinity 
levels in the tanks is not necessarily to kill freshwater organisms in the 
tanks, although this is a secondary effect. Rather, the intent is a 100 
percent exchange of water and organisms, as it is believed that oceanic 
organisms that could survive in the Great Lakes would have already 
migrated there long ago. Hence, oceanic ballast exchange represents 
an exchange of organisms across two distinct ecological zones by 
which reciprocal introductions do not occur (Reeves 1999). In 2001, 
the State of Michigan enacted Public Act 114, which requires report-
ing of ballast management and ties eligibility for state grants, awards, 
and loans to satisfactory ballast management. 
3 First, a vessel does not have to conduct an oceanic exchange if it is 
deemed to be unsafe. Hull stress increases and stability decreases 
during an oceanic exchange (Reeves 1999), and it is not uncommon 
for captains to opt out of an exchange for safety reasons. Second, 
ballast exchange typically does not result in a 100 percent replacement 
of all ballast water and sludge (Rigby and Taylor 2001, Reeves 1999).
Many organisms are left in the tanks, and the high salinity levels do 
not kill them all (Rigby and Taylor 2001, Reeves 1999). A third limi-
tation is that the regulations do not apply to vessels entering the Great 
Lakes with no ballast on board (NOBOB)—vessels that typically carry 
tons of unpumpable sludge at the bottom of their hulls. This sludge 
may be home to many foreign organisms that can be introduced when 
the ship initially takes on ballast at its first stop in the Great Lakes 
and/or when it exchanges ballast at subsequent ports. Farley (1996) 
estimates that ships entering the Great Lakes with a NOBOB status 
accounted for 84 percent of the discharged ballast containing foreign 
water in 1995.
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i
specific biosecurity choices made by a vessel, or 
a performance proxy—estimates of emissions, 
where the estimates are derived from a model that 
relates vessel characteristics and observable bio-
security investments to emissions estimates. Per-
formance proxies are used in other contexts, such 
as in existing point-nonpoint water quality trading 
programs, where reductions in nonpoint loads are 
estimated based on a farmer’s management prac-
tices (Horan 2001). In the present context an 
emissions estimate is more accurately described 
as the probability of a species introduction by the 
vessel. California has implemented a permit pro-
gram that is essentially based on such a perform-
ance proxy. Vessels are issued permits based on 
ballast exchange, but they are free to adopt alter-
native technologies that achieve similar outcomes 
in terms of risk reduction (Karaminas et al. 2000). 
  In this paper we examine the relative efficiency 
of various economic incentives for reducing the 
risk of IAS invasions in the Great Lakes, where 
the type of incentive differs according to the com-
pliance measure used. Specifically, we consider 
subsidies to reduce the risk of an invasion and 
subsidies to implement certain biosecurity meas-
ures.
4 The particular forms of these subsidies are 
not first-best in the sense of minimizing the ex-
pected cost of reducing invasion risks. Such sub-
sidies, as we describe below, would be exces-
sively complex to administer because they would 
have to be tailored to individual vessels in accor-
dance with each vessel’s marginal environmental 
impacts. Rather, we consider second-best subsi-
dies that are not tailored to individual vessels and, 
in the case of biosecurity subsidies, do not target 
each possible biosecurity choice that a vessel 
could make. A lack of differential targeting re-
duces efficiency but may reduce administrative or 
other transaction costs associated with implemen-
tation, and it may circumvent the political or legal 
consequences of treating vessels differentially, as 
uniform subsidy rates are typically viewed as 
fairer. These same issues arise in other pollution 
contexts, most notably the control of nonpoint 
source pollution (Shortle and Abler 1997, Hel-
fand and House 1995). 
A Model of IAS Invasions 
 
The theoretical model we present is based on the 
probabilistic model of Horan et al. (2002). All 
vessels entering the Great Lakes are considered to 
be potential carriers, or vectors, of biological pol-
lution. Each vessel makes various biosecurity 
choices that affect the likelihood of species intro-
ductions. For commercial shipping, biosecurity 
choices might include the effort devoted to ballast 
water exchange, the number and location of stops, 
the time spent at sea, and the use of treatments 
such as biocides, filtering, and heat. Denote the 
ith vessel’s choices by the (1 × m) input vector xi 
(with jth element xij). Although in our empirical 
model many inputs will be “lumpy” investments, 
we treat them as continuous for now. Vessel i’s 
private biological pollution control costs (not 
including economic damages to other parties) are 
a function of the vessel’s biosecurity choices, 
ci(xi). 
 Denote  eis as the biomass of species s ( s = 
1,...,S) that is introduced in the given habitat by 
vessel i. Vessels cannot control eis with certainty. 
Introductions are random due to the influence of 
stochastic variables not directly under the vessel’s 
control (e.g., environmental drivers), although the 
probability of a particular level of biomass emis-
sions is conditional on the vessel’s biosecurity 
choices. The probability that eis is introduced, 
conditional on input choices and vessel character-
istics (bi), is pis(eis| xi, bi). 
  An introduced species may or may not establish 
(invade). Conditions, such as the in situ control 
regime (taken as given here), must be right for a 
successful invasion. Successful invasions occur 
with some probability, conditional on the scale of 
the introduction and also location and habitat 
characteristics (e.g., predators and food sources), 
denoted by h. Denote the probability that intro-
duction  eis leads to a successful invasion by 
 which is increasing in e Pr ( | , , ), si s survival e xh is. 
The biosecurity choices a vessel makes influences 
this probability to the extent that these choices 
influence the quality of an introduction. For in-
stance, the state of health of an introduced species 
may be directly influenced by a vessel’s biosecu-
rity choices. Thus, for discrete levels of eis, the 
probability that introductions of species s by ves-
sel i lead to an invasion is 
__________________________________________ 
4 Subsidies (as opposed to taxes) are considered because shipping in 
the Great Lakes is a highly subsidized industry, and there is fear that 
costly regulatory measures could significantly reduce shipping volume 
in the Great Lakes and thereby hurt local industries that are dependent 
upon this sector (Reeves 1999). 
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(,,) P r ( | ,,) ( |,) is i i s is i is is i i
eis
qs u r v i v a l e p e =∑ xbh xh xb . 
This specification assumes that invasions arise 
from particular vessels and that the probability of 
an invasion from one vessel is independent of any 
introductions by other vessels. Although this may 
be a simplification for some cases in which the 
alien population depends on a large number of 
introductions to become established in the new 
habitat, it is a realistic assumption for species that 
are fairly well-suited to the new ecosystem and 
that can establish with only small numbers.
5
  Because a species is able to proliferate in situ 
once it has invaded and because new invasions 
tend to start out small, any further invasions of 
the same species are likely to have small, if not 
negligible, impacts on damages. Hence, we focus 
our concern on the initial invasion, which is also 
consistent with the policy focus on prevention.
6 
This property, that subsequent invasions have 
negligible marginal damages, distinguishes the 
biological pollution problem from many classic 
pollution problems in which the current level of 
emissions matters. To reflect this, a species inva-
sion is modeled as a Bernoulli event: an invasion 
either occurs or it does not occur. The probability 
of an invasion of species s from any one of n ves-
sels is 
(1)      1
1
( ,..., ) ( 1) 1 ( 0)
1( 1 ( , , ) ) ,
sn s s s
n
is i i i
PP Z P Z
q
=




where Zs represents the number of times that spe-
cies s invades a given ecosystem. The invasion 
probability Ps is decreasing in biosecurity meas-
ures that make introductions less likely, and in-
creasing in biosecurity measures that make intro-
ductions more likely. The probability Ps is also 
increasing in the number of vessels. As n→∞, an 
invasion becomes a virtual certainty (i.e., Ps→1). 
 
Cost-Effective Management 
of Biological Pollution 
Ex-ante efficient biosecurity measures minimize 
the expected social cost of biological pollution 
and its control.
7  But the reality is that the 
complete state space and associated probabilities, 
for both potential invaders and potential damages 
from known and unknown potential invaders, 
cannot be identified ex ante. A reasonable alter-
native to the ex-ante efficient problem is to pur-
sue a cost-effective allocation of biosecurity con-
trols based on a smaller set of probabilistic 
information that can be developed subjectively. 
Cost-effectiveness is a standard benchmark for 
analyzing pollution control policies, and identify-
ing the cost-effective solutions is a necessary 
input to any balancing of the social costs of bio-
logical pollution. 
  An ex-ante cost-effective allocation of biosecu-
rity measures minimizes the expected cost of bio-








=∑ x , 
__________________________________________ 
5 To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical evidence to 
support the notion that an invasion is more likely to occur if there are 
introductions by multiple vessels. In the case of the Great Lakes, for 
example, a particular species introduction via ballast water is typically 
very small, both individually (e.g., measured in microns) and collec-
tively (i.e., their relative density in the water column is minuscule). To 
say that multiple introductions help an introduced population to estab-
lish or invade means that these minuscule populations would have to 
find each other within this vast ecosystem. It seems more likely that a 
small, fast-growing species could proliferate with only a single intro-
duction. This is the type of species we consider, and it is the type that 
Kolar and Lodge (2002) and Ricciardi and Rasmussen (1998) identify 
as the most likely to invade. 
6 The model is static, and so the issue of eradication and re-invasion 
does not come up. But it is probably not a serious concern because, to 
our knowledge, no Great Lakes invader has ever been successfully 
eradicated. Once an invasion occurs, it is typically assumed that the 
species is there to stay—even when there are substantial control efforts 
in place. In the Great Lakes, few invasives have viable control pro-
grams. Where successful control programs do exist, for example for 
sea lamprey (Lupi, Hoehn, and Christie 2003), no means of eradication 
is known. For settings where eradication and reinvasion are likely, an 
alternative formulation of invasion risk would be necessary. 
subject to environmental constraints related to 
invasions. Useful notions of cost-effectiveness for 
biological pollution control must consider the 
unobservable and stochastic nature of species 
introductions and the stochastic nature of inva-
sions. Hence, we use probabilistic constraints of 
the form 
(2)   1 ( ,..., ) s ns P ≤ Φ xx ,  ˆ s S ∀∈ , 
__________________________________________ 
7 Perrings, Williamson, and Dalmazzone (2000) point out that the 
probabilities of invasion may be quite small and the associated dam-
ages quite large, which may give rise to non-convexities. Moreover, 
managers might not make decisions according to expected utility 
theory in such instances, instead making decisions based on a refer-
ence point. Shackle’s (1969) theory of decision making under uncer-
tainty (ignorance) is consistent with a reference point approach, and 
Horan et al. (2002) illustrate that making decisions in this fashion can 
be equivalent to using the expected utility model with subjective 
weights applied to the reference point. 
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where 0 ≤Φs≤ 1 and   (with  ) represents 
a set of target species upon which controls are 
based. The target probability levels (
ˆ S ˆ SS ⊆
s Φ ) may be 
chosen based on political and fiscal considera-
tions related to expected industry control costs 
and to the government budgetary impacts of sub-
sidy outlays. This “safety-first” approach, which 
has been addressed in research on the control of 
stochastic pollution (Beavis and Walker 1983, 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1988, Lichtenberg, 
Zilberman, and Bogen 1989), is consistent with 
the goals of the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO). The IMO has accepted that reducing 
risk, rather than eliminating it, should form the 
basis for new mandatory ballast water manage-
ment instruments (Rigby and Taylor 2001).
8 The 
focus on target species is an approach that has 
been formally adopted by the Australian Ballast 
Water Management Council (Rigby and Taylor 
2001). The target species may be chosen based on 
the perceived likelihood of their invasion and of 
ensuing damages (see Kolar and Lodge [2002] 
and Ricciardi and Rasmussen [1998] for more on 
the issue of estimating invasion risks). Moreover, 
since biosecurity controls are often not specific to 
any one species, the set of target species may be 
chosen to represent certain classes of species hav-
ing similar biological/ecological traits. This prac-
tice may help prevent invasions by similar species 
whose potential to invade is not suspected or 
known ex ante. 
  The necessary conditions for an interior, cost-
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where λs is the shadow value of the sth constraint 
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is the aggregate probability that species s will 
invade from any vessel other than vessel i. Condi-
tion (3) requires that, in the cost-effective solu-
tion, the marginal cost of undertaking a particular 
action (the left-hand side) equals the imputed 
marginal value of reduced risk stemming from the 
action (the right-hand side). The marginal value 
of reduced risk is vessel-specific and will depend 
on vessel i’s actions as well as on the actions of 
all the other vessels. 
Incentive Mechanisms 
Using condition (3), it would be straightforward 
to show that first-best subsidies, i.e., cost-
effective subsidies that result in condition (3) 
being satisfied, could be developed based on re-
ducing the risk of invasion or based on biosecu-
rity investments. We do not derive these optimal 
subsidies here, but rather describe some of their 
basic features (see Shortle and Abler [1997] for 
more on first-best instrument design in the closely 
related case of nonpoint source pollution). In the 
case of first-best risk-reduction subsidies, the 
right-hand side of (3) implies that the subsidy 
rates would have to be set at vessel-specific rates 
to account for the distinct marginal environmental 
impacts that each vessel’s risk has on aggregate 
risk, and the subsidies would have to be applied 
separately for each species of concern. In the case 
of first-best biosecurity-based or input-based sub-
sidies, the right-hand side of (3) suggests that the 
subsidy rates would have to be vessel-specific 
and applied to each input that might influence 
risk. Each of these first-best options is adminis-
tratively complex. We therefore consider two 
types of “second-best” subsidy programs, where 
some efficiency is sacrificed for greater adminis-
trative ease and, presumably, lower transaction 
costs. 
  The first type of subsidy we consider is based 
on a reduction in the probability that a vessel in-
troduces any species,  iii  The restriction 
of a single probabilistic compliance measure (as 
opposed to separate compliance measures for 
each species of concern) reduces efficiency, but 
such a system would be easier to implement and 
manage. The risk-reduction subsidy is of the form 
ii  where ρ is the subsidy rate 
for reducing the risk of an invasion, and  i  is a 
baseline level of risk from which actual risk must 
be reduced in order for the vessel to receive a 
payment. Assume that  ii i  is the initial 
risk posed by vessel i in the unregulated equilib-
(,,) . q xbh
qq ρ−
q
0 qq = x




8 Technically, the IMO is promoting the use of the precautionary 
principle of minimizing risk (Rigby and Taylor 2001). However, it also 
realizes that risk cannot be completely eliminated, suggesting that it 
understands that the costs of attaining such an objective would be too 
high. Our focus on a safety-first criterion therefore appears to be con-
sistent with their objectives. 
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rium where it makes input choices  . The re-
striction of uniformly applying the subsidy rate ρ 
across all vessels implies certain inefficiencies 
due to the fact that each vessel has a different 
marginal environmental impact. 
0
i x
  The risk-reduction subsidy we have described 
is voluntary. Vessels will evaluate whether they 
are better off with or without the subsidy, and 
they will make biosecurity investments only if the 
subsidies cover the associated costs. If there were 
no fixed costs and if the marginal cost of risk 
reduction was non-decreasing, then vessels would 
generally be willing to invest some effort in bio-
security. For instance, in Figure 1 the marginal 
cost of risk reduction, MC, is increasing. Profit-
maximizing vessels choose the level of risk re-
duction such that MC = ρ. Given that ρ is set at a 
constant level, the total subsidy payment, area 
R+TVC , covers the vessel’s biosecurity costs, 
TVC, and also provides surplus rents in the 
amount of R. Now suppose fixed costs are rele-
vant. The rents must exceed these fixed costs if 
the vessel is to accept the subsidy and undertake 
the biosecurity investments. 
  The second type of subsidy that we consider is 
an input-based subsidy of the form  j ij x ς , where 
j ς  is the subsidy rate for biosecurity choice j. The 
subsidy rate is applied uniformly to all vessels, 
and subsidies are applied only to a subset of eas-
ily observable inputs. Both of these features ease 
administration costs but decrease efficiency. As 
above, fixed costs may discourage some vessels 








q0 − q* q0 − q
 
Figure 1. Subsidy Rents, R, Must Cover Fixed 
Costs to Induce Participation 
An Application to Great Lakes Shipping 
We investigate several incentive policies nu-
merically using data on transoceanic vessels that 
operate in the Great Lakes. The empirical appli-
cation builds on the effort of Horan and Lupi 
(2005), who investigated the potential use of 
tradable risk permits for preventing IAS. Al-
though we have made every effort to calibrate 
the model realistically, research on potential 
Great Lakes invaders is still evolving and is at a 
fairly early stage, so knowledge of many pa-
rameters is somewhat limited. The following 
analysis is therefore best viewed as a numerical 
example rather than a true reflection of reality. 
Nonetheless, the results shed light on the eco-
nomic issues surrounding the prevention of new 
invasions in the Great Lakes. 
  In the application, we use official statistics on a 
subset of 315 transoceanic vessels (“salties”) that 
travel the St. Lawrence Seaway (U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers 2002). The data represent the major-
ity of Seaway vessels and are used to develop 31 
“classes” of vessels distinguished by their dead-
weight tonnage (DWT). Costs and probabilities 
are aggregated within each vessel class using a 
microparameter approach (Just and Antle 1990). 
In addition to the transoceanic vessels, a number 
of other vessels, known as “lakers”, operate ex-
clusively on the Great Lakes. While lakers may 
be responsible for spreading IAS within the Great 
Lakes, they are not responsible for new introduc-
tions into the region. Our focus is on vessels that 
pose a threat of new introductions. 
  Since Reeves (1999) reports that vessels carry 
15–30 percent of DWT in ballast water, 30 per-
cent of DWT is used as the value of ballast water 
capacity, denoted bi for the ith vessel, although it 
is not assumed that each vessel enters the Seaway 
carrying that much ballast. Instead, this value 
represents each vessel’s potential ballast, and the 
vessel may enter or leave the Seaway with all of 
this ballast or a fraction thereof. Because a tank 
can never be fully emptied (i.e., bi > 0), this value 
also accounts for the unpumpable sludge in a ves-
sel’s tanks. This sludge factor is relevant for the 
majority of vessels entering the Seaway with no 
ballast on board (NOBOB) (Reeves 1999). 
  Although the target species concept has not 
been adopted in the Great Lakes as it has been in 
Australia (Rigby and Taylor 2001), some poten-
tial invaders of concern have been identified. 
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Many of these potential invaders are from the 
Ponto-Caspian region (Ricciardi and Rasmussen 
1998, Kolar and Lodge 2002). We focus on three 
Ponto-Caspian species that have been identified 
as likely invaders capable of causing extensive 
damage (Ricciardi and Rasmussen 1998, Kolar 
and Lodge 2002): Corophium spp. (a small am-
phipod),  mysids (a small shrimp), and Clupe-
onella caspia (a small fish). These three species 
also span a range of organism “types” and sizes 
of likely invaders; some details of their life histo-
ries are presented in Table 1. 
 Denote  kis as the base probability that vessel i 
transports species s into the Great Lakes when the 
vessel adopts no biosecurity measures. In the 
model, this value is directly proportional to the 
ballast (or sludge) the vessel carries, kis = αisbi, 
where αis > 0 is a parameter: larger vessels are 
more likely to bring in species, ceteris paribus. In 
general,  αis may vary according to the vessel’s 
trade route. However, since most vessels follow 
the triangle trade route and since we lack detailed 
information on ports visited and the risks associ-
ated with specific ports, this value is set equal for 
all vessels. Assuming species s is introduced into 
the environment, the likelihood that the species 
establishes is denoted βs. Without any biosecurity 
efforts, βsαisbi represents the likelihood of an in-
vasion of species s by vessel i. 
  Vessels can adopt biosecurity techniques to 
reduce the chances of an invasion. Filtration re-
duces the likelihood that species will enter or exit 
a vessel’s ballast tanks. The effectiveness of fil-
tration on species s  is denoted by the function 
φFs(xiF), with xiF∈[0,1] and    (0) 0, (1) Fs Fs φ= φ
U
Fs φ , where 
U
Fs φ  is an upper bound on φFs. Here, 
xiF is an index representing the effort applied to 
the filtration technology, e.g., by choice of filter 
mesh sizes. The subscript F, here and elsewhere, 
represents filtration. 
  The survival of species in ballast water during 
transit is affected by in-transit ballast manage-
ment practices. The most promising in-transit 
practices are ballast exchange via continuous 
flushing, reballasting, heat, chemical treatments, 
and ultraviolet radiation (Rigby and Taylor 2001, 
Pollutech Environmental Limited [Pollutech] 
1996). Reballasting is often considered danger-
ous; ballast exchange via continuous flushing has 
been shown to be safer and as effective (Rigby 
and Taylor 2001). Chemical treatments are usu-
ally discouraged due to their high cost and the 
safety and environmental hazards associated with 
their use (NRC 1996, Rigby and Taylor 2001, 
Pollutech 1996). Ultraviolet radiation is not con-
sidered a stand-alone technology—it is not usu-
ally considered effective unless it is combined 
with a filtering technology, but, even in combina-
tion with filtering, experts disagree on its poten-
tial (NRC 1996). Thus, the two in-transit prac-
tices we consider are heat and ballast exchange 
via continuous flushing (henceforth, ballast ex-
change), which Perakis and Yang (2001) suggest 
as the most promising practices (along with filter-
ing) for the Great Lakes. 
  The effectiveness of each biosecurity practice 
will depend on the level of effort devoted to the 
practice. For instance, the quantity of ballast ex-
change depends on the duration of the exchange. 
The effectiveness of heat depends on tempera-
tures being high enough and applied for sufficient 
duration to kill all target organisms, which can be 
difficult and costly (Rigby and Taylor 2001, Pol-
lutech 1996, NRC 1996). As defined above for 
filtering, define the effectiveness of in-transit 
practice j on species s by φjs(xij) (with xij∈[0,1] 
and  (0) 0, (1)
U
jsj s j s φ =φ = φ , where 
U
js φ is an upper 
bound on φjs).
9
  With this specification for the effectiveness of 
the three control technologies, the probability that 
species s invades due to the activities of vessel i is 
given by 
[1 ( )][1 ( )][1 ( )] i s s B si B H si H F si F i s qx x x k = β− φ − φ − φ , 
where the indices B, H, and F represent ballast 
exchange, heat, and filtering, respectively. For 
each technology, let  ()
js
jsi i j i j j x x
δ φ= µ  (j = F,B,H). 
The parameters µij and δjs were calibrated from 
reports on the effectiveness of ballast water man-
agement practices (Rigby and Taylor 2001) (see 
Table 1). Although the effectiveness data were 
not directly developed for our three target spe-
cies, the data do relate to life history and physio-
logical characteristics possessed by our target 
species. The parameter βs is set equal to 0.1 ∀s 
based on the observation of Perrings et al. (2002),  
__________________________________________ 
9 It is necessary for the regulatory agency to have perfect knowledge 
of each vessel’s actual effort levels in order to accurately gauge 
whether the vessel is in compliance with its subsidized effort levels.
We assume here that it is possible to perfectly monitor effort levels, 
although in reality monitoring may be difficult and vessels may have 
incentives to misrepresent their actual effort levels. 
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Table 1. Effectiveness of Various Ballast Water Management Technologies for Great Lakes 
Target Species 
  Control Technology 
Target 
Species  Ballast Exchange  Heating  Filtration 
Clupeonella 
caspia 
Not generally effective 
at killing organisms 
(Rigby and Taylor 
2001). Somewhat 
effective at removing 
individual organisms 
from the tanks as the 
exchange occurs. We 
assume efficiency 
equals the proportion 
of exchange that 
occurs. 
The species clupeonella 
cultriventris caspia naturally 
occur in temperatures up to 26
οC 
(Aseinova 2003), although this 
may not be the upper bound for 
survival. We assume 99 percent 
efficiency for 40
οC (xH = 1) and 
90 percent efficiency for 35
οC 
(xH = 0.5). 
For clupeonella cultriventris caspia, eggs are 
1 mm, larvae are 1.3–1.8 mm, and fingerlings 
are 50–55 mm. Adults average 7.8 cm—much 
too large to fit through any filter. However, 
population structures are weighted heavily by 
newer recruits (Aseinova 2003). Sizes of these 
younger fish are similar to rotifers and small 
copepods. We adopt Ribgy and Taylor’s 
(2001) reported removal efficiencies for cope-
pods: we assume 95 percent effectiveness for a 
100 µm filter (xF = 0.1) and 99 percent effec-
tiveness for a 25 µm filter (xF = 1). 
Corophium 
spp. 
  Corophium curvispinum have 
been known to naturally occur in 
warm lakes up to 31
οC (Rajagopal 
et al. 1999), although this may not 
be the upper bound for survival. 
Mortality rates will depend on the 
ballast water temperature 
achieved, the time to achieve it, 
and the duration of heating. 
Temperatures in excess of 40
οC 
are hard to achieve and maintain 
in colder waters such as the 
northern Atlantic. We assume 90 
percent efficiency for 40
οC 
(xH = 1) and 50 percent efficiency 
for 35
οC (xH = 0.5). 
Corophium are marsupial-like amphipods that 
carry their young in pouches until the eggs 
hatch. There are many related species. For 
Corophium curvispinum, juveniles are 550 µm 
in length (Rajagopal et al. 1999) but possibly 
narrow enough to fit through mesh. Juveniles 
are up to 1.8 mm and adults average 3.75 mm 
(Rajagopal et al. 1999). Rigby and Taylor 
(2001) report removal efficiency of 50 µm to 
25 µm filters to be from 80 percent for small 
rotifers (rotifers usually range in length from 1 
mm to 250 mm) and 95 percent for bivalve 
vetigers. Given the size of juveniles, we as-
sume 60 percent efficiency for the 50 µm filter 
(xF = 0.5) and 95 percent for the 25 µm filter 
(xF = 1). 
Mysids    The species Paramysis lacustris 
have been known to survive in 
situ in temperatures up to 28
οC 
(Baychorov 1980), although this 
may not be the upper bound for 
survival. We assume 95 percent 
efficiency for 40
οC (xH = 1) and 
60 percent efficiency for 35
οC 
(xH = 0.5). 
Mysids are marsupial-like shrimp that carry 
their young in pouches until the juvenile stage. 
There are many related species. For the species 
Paramysis lacustris, adult females range in 
size from 10 to 14 mm (Baychorov 1980). 
Sizes of newly released juveniles were not 
reported, but for the related species Neomysis 
Americana this size averaged 710 µm (Pez-
zack and Corey 1979). Given that mysids are 
generally larger than corophium and that egg 
deposition is not a concern for mysids, we use 
slightly larger removal efficiencies than for 
corophium: 80 percent for xF = 0.5 and 98 
percent for xF = 1. 
Source: Table adapted from Horan and Lupi (2003). 
 
who note that introduced species often have about 
a 10 percent chance of establishing a viable popu-
lation in the new ecosystem. The parameter αs is 
calibrated to ensure that, in the absence of any 
ballast controls, each species has a moderate 
chance of invading in any given year. Specifi-
cally, each species was assumed to have a 10 per-
cent chance of invasion in any specific year in the 
unregulated base case. Given the limited data, the 
assumption of a 10 percent annual chance of in-
vasion was made because it corresponds to a 65 
percent chance of invasion over the next dec-
ade—consistent with the view of scientists who 
believe an invasion by each of these species is 







somewhat likely in the near future (Ricciardi and 
Rasmussen 1998, Kolar and Lodge 2002). 
  Turning to the private control costs, vessel i’s 
variable control costs are defined by 
() i i ij ij
j
cw =∑ x , 
where wij is the constant per unit cost of practice j 
for vessel i. Unit costs have been shown to vary 
by ballast capacity (Rigby and Taylor 2001). We 
use Rigby and Taylor’s cost data for various ves-
sel sizes (Table 2) to calibrate unit costs by vessel 
size,  ij ij i . There is also a fixed capital cost 
associated with the use of some technologies. 





  To determine the cost-effective combination of 
practices, the cost-minimization problem is 
solved for several levels for the probabilistic con-
straint on aggregate invasion risk, Φ
10
s. Because 
there are multiple control technologies, each with 
their own lumpy fixed costs, a constrained, 
mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) 
problem must be solved to determine cost-
minimizing allocations of control efforts. Although 
there are many ways to solve such problems, we 
adopt a brute-force approach that is equivalent to 
determining an optimum for each possible com-
bination of technology adoption choices across 
vessels and then comparing these local optima to 
find the global optimum. In our case, each of the 
31 vessel classes has eight possible combinations 
of technology choices (to use, or not use, each of 
up to three technologies). Consequently, there are 
8
31 possible technology combinations for which 
the locally optimal effort levels must be found. 
Fortunately, many of these permutations are 
dominated and can be eliminated from considera-
tion, as Horan and Lupi (2005) have determined 
that (i) the high fixed costs of technologies im-
plies that it is never optimal for a single vessel to 
adopt two technologies, and (ii) it is never opti-
mal for a smaller vessel to adopt filtration while a 
larger vessel adopts ballast exchange, because 
this would only increase costs and reduce effec-
tiveness.
11 So, such dominated permutations (the 
bulk of possibilities) are therefore ruled out of the 
comparisons. This enables us to solve for optimal 
effort levels and to compare results from a small 
subset of permutations. 
 
Results 
Simulation results for several values of Φs are 
reported in Table 3 for the least-cost or first-best 
outcome, risk-reduction subsidies, and various 
uniform technological subsidies. Because we lack 
specific policy reasons for setting differential risk 
levels, in what follows we set Φs equal to Φ ∀s∈ 
, so we drop the subscript s from Φ in what 
follows. In addition to Table 3, costs are also pre-
sented in Figure 2 for different levels of risk Φ. 
Costs are expressed as an index, with the base 
case being industry-wide costs in the least-cost 
outcome when Φ = 0.05 (the least stringent case). 
An index value of 175, for example, would indi-
cate that costs are 75 percent larger than costs in 
the base case. 
ˆ S
  Consider the results for the least-cost or first-
best scenario. This scenario is characterized by 
participation by all vessels, with a mix of tech-
nologies adopted across vessels. The specific 
cost-effective mix of technologies used by the 
vessels depends on the value of Φ. Ballast ex-
change is used more extensively in the least-cost 
solution when the allowable risk level (Φ) is lar-
ger, as evidenced in Table 3 by the proportion of 
total control costs in ballast exchange. When the 
constraint on the overall level of risk (Φ) is re-
duced (making the constraint more stringent), 
effective ballast transfers require so much effort 
that it becomes optimal for some vessels to incur 
the fixed costs of filtration to take advantage of 
filtration’s low unit cost and higher effectiveness. 
Heating’s high unit costs prevent it from being a 
cost-effective option for any vessel for any value 
of  Φ. Because the least-cost approach would 
emerge from the use of first-best subsidies ap-
plied to risk reduction, we also present subsidy 
payments for the least-cost case in Table 3. Sub-
sidy payments for this case are indicated to equal 
total costs. The actual payments depend critically 
on the choice of baseline, which along with the 
subsidy rate represents a lump-sum, non-dis-
tortionary component of the subsidy. Because 
first-best subsidy rates are vessel-specific, we have 
assumed that the baselines can also be chosen to 
__________________________________________ 
10 After deriving fixed costs, they are annualized using a rate of 8 
percent over a 15-year interval to obtain the results in Table 2.  
11 Of course, fixed costs also matter and in theory could affect this 
result, but random experiments support the assumption. 
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Table 2. Costs of Ballast Water Management Technologies 
   Ballast Capacity (m
3
) 
Control Technology  Type of Costs
a 12,000  60,000 
Ballast Exchange (with xB = 0.75)  Variable costs  2.814  2.244 
 Fixed  costs  2.238  0.540 
Filtration (with xF = 1)  Variable costs  0.180  19.050 
 Fixed  costs  0.480  6.564 
Heating (with xH = 1)  Variable costs  2.684  3.355 
 Fixed  costs  0.432  0.540 
a
All costs are expressed in U.S. cents/m
3.
Source: Table adapted from Rigby and Taylor (2001). 
 
be vessel-specific and set at a level that ensures 
that the subsidies just cover control costs. This 
represents the best-case scenario for subsidies since 
it is the smallest subsidy for which vessels will 
participate, and since it ensures no rent transfer. 
  Now consider the results for the subsidy on risk 
reduction. The relative performance of this sub-
sidy scheme depends on the overall risk level, as 
can be seen in Table 3 and in Figure 2. When Φ = 
0.05, control costs are 28 percent larger under the 
subsidy than in the least-cost allocation, while 
there is only a 14 percent difference when Φ = 
0.005. As with the least-cost scenario, all vessels 
participate in the case of risk-reduction subsidies. 
Under both subsidy scenarios, most vessels adopt 
filtration when Φ is set at low levels, and they 
increase their effort levels in this technology as Φ 
is reduced. But they can increase their effort lev-
els only so much before they hit an upper bound 
on the effectiveness of the technology. The result 
is that the inefficiencies of the risk-reduction sub-
sidy are diminished as Φ becomes smaller because 
there are fewer technological/behavioral options 
as Φ is reduced. Even in the least-cost outcome, 
more and more vessels must operate with maxi-
mum effort when more stringent goals must be 
satisfied, leaving less room to exploit vessel-
specific cost differences that could otherwise lead 
to increased savings. Consequently, the least-cost 
and risk-reduction allocations become more simi-
lar when the aggregate risk goal is lowered. 
  Where inefficiencies do arise under the risk-
reduction subsidy, this subsidy results in higher 
costs for two reasons. First, the subsidy is based 
on the risk of an introduction by any species, and 
so vessels do not have incentives to differentially 
consider how their choices affect the likelihood of 
invasion by each individual species. The result is 
overcontrol of mysids and Clupeonella caspia 
relative to the least-cost outcome. The risk-
reduction subsidy’s second and perhaps more 
important source of inefficiency is that the incen-
tive rate is uniformly applied to all vessels and 
does not take into account the differential mar-
ginal impacts that each vessel’s risk has on the 
aggregate likelihood of an invasion. The result is 
that vessels with high marginal costs and small 
marginal risk impacts will over-invest in pollution 
control measures, while vessels with low mar-
ginal costs and large marginal risk impacts will 
under-invest, reducing the cost-effectiveness of 
the resulting allocation of controls (Baumol and 
Oates 1988). Specifically, more of the smaller 
vessels invest in filtration under the risk-
reduction subsidy, significantly increasing the 
fixed costs incurred relative to the least-cost solu-
tion. The uniform subsidy does not affect the lar-
ger vessels’ choice to adopt filtration, relative to 
the first-best case, but it does cause them to apply 
less effort to this technology than in the first-best 
case. Due to the large fixed costs of filtration and 
the small variable costs, the net effect is an ineffi-
ciently large allocation of costs to filtration. This 
explains why the risk-reduction subsidy results in 
a larger proportion of costs in filtration relative to 
the least-cost solution (see Table 3). 
  Full participation in the risk-reduction subsidy 
case implies that the rents created by the subsidies 
are sufficient for covering fixed costs. As de-
scribed above, this result could occur if the sub-
sidy rate was set inefficiently high in order to 
boost rents and encourage participation. But 
boosting rents in this manner is not required in 
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Figure 3. Subsidy Payments by Incentive 
Program
emerge even if all fixed costs were to vanish, that 
is, even if any potential participation barriers were 
removed. In other words, fixed costs are not a 
binding constraint on participation under the risk-
reduction subsidy. 
  Figure 3 illustrates that, as Φ is reduced, there 
is an increasing divergence between subsidy pay-
ments in the risk-reduction and least-cost cases. 
Because least-cost subsidies equal control costs in 
the least-cost case and because we know control 
costs converge as Φ gets small, this result simply 
means that risk-reduction subsidy rents are larger 
when there is more control. This is a standard 
result in the economics literature on conventional 
pollution control (Baumol and Oates 1988). 
  Now consider the case of a uniform filtration 
subsidy, which is generally a more costly ap-
proach than either the least-cost or risk-reduction 
scenarios. When Φ = 0.05, the filtration subsidy 
is 55.6 percent more costly than the least-cost 
approach, and it is 21.6 percent more costly than 
the risk-reduction subsidy. The reason is that the 
filtration subsidy is not as well targeted. First, it 
does not always encourage full participation. For 
larger values of Φ, the filtration subsidy does not 
provide sufficient rents to cover fixed costs for all 
vessels, and so only 73 percent of the vessels par-
ticipate when Φ = 0.05 (Table 3). This means that 
Φ is achieved through excess controls by the par-
ticipating vessels. In addition to this allocative 
inefficiency, additional inefficiencies arise be-
cause the subsidy provides poorly targeted incen-
tives among those vessels that do participate. 
These inefficiencies arise because (i) the subsidy 
base, filtration, is less correlated with the exter-
nality than the compliance measures of the other 
two approaches and therefore does not provide 
incentives for vessels to choose the least-cost 
options for reducing risk, and (ii) the uniformity 
of the subsidy does not encourage vessels to con-
sider the marginal environmental impacts of their 
individual control efforts. In contrast, the risk-
reduction subsidy is more efficient because it 
encourages vessels to choose among multiple 
technologies to reduce risk in a least-cost fashion. 
This result is analogous to those results of the 
pollution control literature that find that perform-
ance-based (emissions-based) instruments are 
more cost-effective than technology-based in-
struments (Russell and Powell 2000). The ineffi-
ciencies associated with participation and correla-
tion with risk are diminished as Φ is reduced be-
cause full participation is encouraged to achieve 
the most stringent risk goals and, as discussed 
above, because filtration becomes the primary 
technology for achieving small values of Φ in the 
least-cost solution. Indeed, Figure 2 illustrates a 
convergence in costs for the three approaches 
described so far. 
  Figure 3 illustrates that aggregate filtration sub-
sidy payments are smaller than risk-reduction 
subsidy payments when Φ = 0.05. This is because 
there are fewer vessels to pay in this case under 
the filtration scenario, although the payment per 
vessel is larger than in the risk-reduction sce-
nario. As participation is increased under the fil-
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tration scenario as Φ gets smaller, aggregate sub-
sidy payments rise, and become larger than those 
arising under the risk-reduction subsidy. 
  Consider the last two subsidy scenarios: those 
based on ballast exchange and heat. When Φ = 
0.05, the ballast exchange subsidy results in costs 
that are 128 percent larger than in the least-cost 
outcome and 64 percent larger than those arising 
under risk-reduction subsidies. As Φ is reduced, 
the absolute cost differences only get larger (al-
though the percentage differences get smaller). 
As illustrated in Figure 3, subsidy payments un-
der the ballast exchange system are 40 percent 
larger than risk-reduction payments when Φ = 
0.05, and this difference grows to 182 percent for 
Φ = 0.005. Finally, the uniform heat subsidy is 
vastly more expensive than all of the other ap-
proaches, and is therefore not depicted in Figure 
2 or Figure 3. 
 
Conclusion 
Alien invasive species transported in ballast water 
are a form of trade-related biological pollution 
and, as such, their prevention can be treated as a 
type of transboundary pollution control problem. 
Unlike many conventional pollutants, IAS emis-
sions cannot be measured or controlled with cer-
tainty, and not every vessel will actually emit a 
species. These characteristics raise the issue of 
what compliance measures pollution policy in-
struments should be based on. As we have de-
scribed, options include particular pollution pre-
vention technologies as well as a performance 
proxy consisting of estimates of a vessel’s contri-
bution to the risk of an invasion. 
  To evaluate the potential cost-effectiveness of 
various second-best subsidies for IAS control, a 
model of Great Lakes shipping was developed. 
The simulation results suggest that subsidies 
based on the performance proxy have the poten-
tial to outperform uniform technology subsidies, 
though the efficiency gains from using a perform-
ance-based approach depend on the target level of 
aggregate invasion risk. At low or intermediate 
target levels for aggregate invasion risks, cost 
savings from a performance-based approach do 
emerge because vessels have the flexibility to 
choose from a variety of technologies. However, 
at more stringent levels of aggregate risk reduc-
tion, the responses of vessels are limited and po-
tential cost savings from a performance-based 
approach are smallest. For the lower risk levels, 
the least-cost solution involves most vessels 
adopting filtration. When it is efficient for most 
vessels to use the same control technology, the 
relative gains from using a performance-based 
approach instead of a technology-based approach 
will be small. The findings suggest that, for lower 
allowable risk levels, a uniform technology sub-
sidy can achieve the desired risk reductions at 
relatively low costs, provided the right technol-
ogy is selected for subsidization. Correctly select-
ing the low-cost technology is key to this finding, 
especially in light of the high fixed costs associ-
ated with some of the technologies. 
  The findings presented here are based on the 
limited data currently available for key model 
parameters. A key gap in the available research, 
and a subject on which more research is clearly 
desirable, is the efficacy and costs (fixed and 
variable) of all possible ballast treatment tech-
nologies. As we have shown, such data are vital 
for establishing the relative risks and cost-
effectiveness of policy instruments. We expect 
that improved information in this area will be 
forthcoming, in part due to the ballast technology 
demonstration projects currently underway. Since 
vessel-specific information on invasion risks is 
essential to the definition of the performance 
proxy we propose, the simulations would also 
benefit from more precise estimates of the inva-
sion risks for existing or new potential invaders. 
Clearly, better risk information is a precursor to 
policy implementation of the more cost-effective 
performance proxy instruments. Given the scien-
tific focus on identifying potential invaders and 
estimating invasion risks, we expect that the 
availability of such risk information will improve. 
  Because the focus of this research was on com-
paring policy instruments, the empirical model 
has addressed only the cost-effectiveness of meet-
ing alternative standards for industry-wide inva-
sion risks. No assessment has been made regard-
ing the social desirability of alternative levels for 
the aggregate risk standards. Determining eco-
nomically desirable invasion-risk levels requires 
cost-effectiveness information and information on 
the potential damage costs associated with inva-
sions. Although more ecological and economic 
research is required to make the connection be-
tween invasions and damages, such research is 
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critical to determine whether it is worth the cost 
to undertake any level of ballast control. The rea-
son for this is that any non-zero level for the 
standard on aggregate invasion risk will not per-
manently prevent an invasion. For example, with 
a fairly small annual invasion risk of one percent, 
the risk of invasion over the next decade is 10 
percent and becomes 18 percent risk over the next 
two decades. This suggests that IAS issues are 
properly framed as intertemporal risk manage-
ment problems. But such analyses require more 
information on damages and on potential future 
investment and innovation opportunities than is 
currently available. Invasive alien species prob-
lems do not simply go away while this informa-
tion is being collected, nor does the policy proc-
ess patiently sit and wait for these analyses to be 
performed. Consequently, our research can best 
be viewed as a first step toward understanding 
risk management and policy design issues associ-
ated with IAS problems, and can hopefully in-
form future research and policy debates. 
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